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 1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper deals with the reform of the Dutch Public Employment Service 
(in Dutch: ‘Arbeidsvoorziening’). Since 2001 the implementation of 
publicly funded employment services is largely outsourced to private 
agencies. This reform follows a general trend in Dutch society to reduce the 
role of the government. Similar reforms have taken place in public transport 
and other areas. The general idea is that competition between private 
providers for public contracts leads to more efficiency and to higher quality 
of the services. 
Already at an earlier stage legislation was changed to give more room to the 
private employment services market. Before 1991 job brokerage on a 
commercial basis was not allowed, except for special branches and 
occupations. With the new Employment Services Act of 1991 the 
prohibition was abandoned and a license system for private agencies was 
introduced. Later also the license system was abandoned and market entry 
became free. The expectation was that this liberalization of the employment 
services market would give more competitive pressure from the private 
employment services market to the PES. However, as long as the PES was 
completely subsidized it had little to fear from private agencies. This 
induced the government to go further on the road to privatization. The 
government still thinks that subsidies are needed in the field of employment 
services, but now service delivery is contracted to private agencies. 
However, the next step might be a reduction of the subsidies and a further 
development towards a free market for employment services. 
It should be noted that already before 1991, in spite of the prohibition, 
temporary work agencies (TWAs) were engaged in job brokerage in 
practice. Often companies used temporary work as a hiring channel. 
Typically, for a short period a firm would hire a worker from the agency 
and monitor him on productivity. In case of a satisfactory performance the 
firm would then employ the worker. On the basis of company surveys we 
know that the number of job placements through TWAs was of similar 
magnitude than the number realised by the PES. Therefore, the 
liberalization of the employment services market did not make a big 
difference as long as the PES kept its broad range of (subsidized) activities. 
The decision to involve private agencies in the delivery of public 
employment services was of much more significance, because it implied a 
major transfer of activities from the public to the private sector. In this 
paper we concentrate on the latter development. However, even here the 
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 break with the past is not complete. Involving private providers in the 
implementation of public employment services was not something new. 
Already the Public Employment Service outsourced activities to other 
providers. Only one-third of the available budget for training was spent on 
the PES’s own training institutions, for example. Also one-third was 
oursourced to private training providers and the remaining part to (public) 
vocational schools. Furthermore, in the late 1980s and the early 1990s 
temporary work agencies were involved in the implementation of a scheme 
for subsidized temporary work for the long-term unemployed. However, it 
is fair to say that nowadays the involvement of private agencies is on a 
much larger scale. 
The Netherlands is not the only and not the first country to liberalize the 
employment services market and to involve private agencies in the delivery 
process of public employment services. The UK, for example, has a long 
history in private employment services. However, internationally the 
Netherlands is one of the few countries that has gone so far as to outsource 
most of the implementation of its public employment services to the private 
sector1. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we give a brief history of the 
changes that took place in the position of the PES since the early 1990s. In 
section 3 we discuss the role of the Centres for Work and Income, which is 
basically what is left of the public employment service. Section 4 evaluates 
the procurement of reintegration services in the Netherlands as conducted 
by the agencies responsible for unemployment insurance and disability 
payment. Tendering procedures as conducted by municipalities are the 
subject matter of chapter 5. The outcomes of the beauty contest are the 
subject of section 3. Then, in section 6 we discuss the difficulties in 
assessing the quality of reintegration services and its implications for 
tendering procedures in this field. Finally, section 7 contains the 
conclusions and recommendations. 
                                                     
1 For a comparative analysis of competition issues in public employment services 
covering four countries, see Struyven, Steurs and Peters, 2002. 
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 2 THE NEW SYSTEM AND HOW IT EVOLVED: A 
SHORT HISTORY 
Since the early 1990s the organization of public employment services in the 
Netherlands have been subject to constant change. Until 1991 the structure 
was fairly conventional with the Public Employment Service (PES) being a 
directorate-general of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. In 
1991 a tripartite structure was introduced and from that moment on the 
government and the social partners administered the PES jointly. However, 
the situation was unbalanced as the Ministry, as the sole financing body, 
was still in control. From a legal point of view it had to check the 
rightfulness and effectiveness of the money spent on the PES, implying that 
it also had to check its own actions as a member of the board. This double 
role and the unequal position of the members of the board led to tensions 
and inertia. The 1995 evaluation of the tripartite structure analyses the 
shortcomings of the governance structure (see Dercksen and De Koning 
(1995). On the basis of the criticism it was decided that the Ministry would 
no longer be represented in the board. From then on the Ministry nominated 
independent experts to represent the government in the board. However, a 
different development, already started at the end of the 1980s and 
reinforced since 1994, gradually weakened the position of the PES. 
Subsidized labour gradually became the most important active measure. As 
most people entitled to subsidized labour were clients of the municipal 
social services, and municipalities were an important provider of subsidized 
jobs, municipalities were made responsible for job creation schemes. What 
also played a role is that at the time the PES had a strong employer 
orientation, implying that it did not pay much attention to social assistance 
clients. The number of subsidized job being limited, it was obviously 
important that people stayed in these jobs for a limited period of time only, 
so that others in need of such a job could take their place. Therefore, 
municipalities also started to make attempts to mediate these people to 
regular jobs in the labour market. Sometimes private placement agencies 
were hired to do this job. It implied that already in the first part of the 1990s 
a parallel PES was developing. 
In the second half of the 1990s (starting in 1996 to be precise) 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the PES, the development of parallel 
services and the general trend towards privatization induced the government 
to transfer the budget for ALMPs further from the PES to the bodies 
responsible for unemployment benefits. In the Netherlands two types exist: 
social insurance agencies dealing with unemployment insurance benefits 
and municipalities dealing with social assistance benefits (for those not 
entitled to social insurance benefits). At the time 5 social insurance 
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 agencies (UVIs) existed: Cadans, Gak, Guo, Sfb and Uszo. The different 
UVIs operated in different sectors of industry. In turn each UVI was also 
organised regionally. For the time being both UVIs and municipalities (of 
which there are several hundreds) were obliged to involve the PES as the 
only service provider. This obligation was only temporary. Later also 
private providers could be involved. In a later stage, the part of the PES 
dealing with reintegration services was privatised. It became known as Kliq 
and is now one of the private reintegration firms that have to compete for 
the contracts that are tendered by the UVIs and the municipalities. The first 
procurement procedure was organized by the UVIs in 2000. The training 
centres coming under the PES were transferred to the regional centres for 
vocational education (ROC’s).  
At the time another player in the field of social security was the Lisv, the 
National Institute for Social Insurance, which functioned as a kind of 
regulator2. The Lisv developed a set of rules for the competitive 
procurement of reintegration activities. The UVIs were compelled to follow 
this procurement procedure when purchasing reintegration trajectories. This 
set of rules is a type of beauty contest. In the year 2000 the first round of 
beauty contests have been held. Also municipalities began to organize 
tendering procedures. However, unlike the UVIs there was no common set 
of rules concerning the latter procedures. 
Since 2000 a number of changes occurred. The five UVIs as well as the 
Lisv have merged into one organisation: UWV. Furthermore, cooperation 
between groups of smaller municipalities was introduced in the form of 
regional platforms. In these platforms municipalities make joint analyses of 
their regional labour market and what it implies for their reintegration 
policies. They also exchange information about procurement procedures, 
although we do not know how far this goes and to what extent 
municipalities co-operate in the organization of these procedures. 
It is important to note that in the new system the delivery structure for 
public employment services is not completely privatised. Public 
employment offices still exist. One of their main tasks is to improve the 
transparency of the labour market by collecting and diffusing information 
on jobseekers and vacancies. Another important task is the profiling of the 
people entering unemployment. These are divided into four groups 
according to their risk of becoming long-term unemployed. Those not in 
high risks can only make use of the services provided by the employment 
offices (mainly information on jobs and benefits), which are now called 
                                                     
2  Lisv: in Dutch “Landelijk Instituut Sociale Verzekeringen”. 
S252papfin 4
 Centres for Work and Income3. Those in high risk of long-term 
unemployment are sent to the UVIs and the municipalities and are entitled 
to reintegration services. As was already indicated, the UVIs contract the 
service delivery to private agencies.  
Many among the larger reintegration firms are offsprings from public 
organisations such as the UVIs and the former PES (this is the earlier 
mentioned firm Kliq). Other reintegration firms were founded by temporary 
work agencies. In addition to these organisations a large number of new 
private firms offering reintegration services, have sprouted up. 
Finally, the Council for Work and Income (RWI) exists. Its task is to advise 
the government in matters of active labour market policy. In this council the 
social partners are represented and in a way it is a remnant of the tripartite 
system. The RWI is one of the few organizations involved in this policy 
field that shows a real interest in evaluation and tries to further the practice 
of evaluation. The efforts made by the RWI are not completely without 
results (we come back to the results of some of the studies commissioned 
by the RWI later), but the fact is that this organization has little power to 
force the other actors to provide the necessary data for evaluation. The 
government has even indicated that it wants to abolish the Council, but this 
is still under discussion. 
In table 1 the various organizations involved in the old and/or the new 
system are listed, and their status (public or private) and function indicated. 
Clearly absent from the table is the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment (SZW). Some see the new system as a trick by the ministry to 
get rid of a policy field that caused the ministry a lot of trouble. High 
expectations have existed of active policies, but the ministry never 
succeeded in realizing these hopes. In the current situation, in which the 
responsibility is delegated to the benefit agencies and the implementation 
largely outsourced to private agencies, the ministry tends to deny even 
overall responsibility. Evaluation studies are not commissioned anymore 
because the ministry does not see this anymore as its responsibility. A 
department within the Ministry (the Inspection for Work and Income or 
IWI) monitors the UWV procurement procedure and makes 
recommendations for improvement. However, it only looks at the process, 
not at the effects. And even the process evaluation is superfluous and does 
not make use of theoretical notions about the procurement of public 
services implementation to private firms. 
                                                     
3 When after six months they are still unemployed, they are also entitled to reintegration 
services. 
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 It is important to note that none of the major systems changes was made on 
the basis of solid evaluations. The tripartite structure was evaluated in 1995, 
but only led to minor changes. A major factor leading to the new structure 
was the general belief that privatisation leads to higher efficiency and 
effectiveness. At one point a serious option was even to privatise not only 
employment services but also to privatise social security. That would have 
led to a system where the government only determines who is entitled to a 
benefit and also the level and the duration of the benefit. Private insurance 
companies would then compete for contracts with branches of industry. 
These companies would then involve private employment services agencies 
as far as these agencies succeed in speeding up job entry. However, such a 
system was seen as too risky. It is also clear that the final design of the 
system is partly made in view of the interests of the various organizations. 
For the clients it is not necessarily the best system. 
Although the implementation of active policies is largely outsourced to 
private agencies, the services are still paid for by the government. As was 
already indicated in section 1, also a private employment services exists 
that is not subsidized. It mainly consists of temporary work agencies. The 
primary task of TWAs is to provide employers with temporary workers. 
However, many employers use this as a hiring device. They use the period 
during which a worker is hired from an agency to monitor the performance 
of the worker in view of offering him a permanent contract. As long as the 
government subsidizes job brokerage and other employment services, job 
brokerage activities that are not connected with temporary work will be 
difficult on a purely commercial basis. One could agree that the government 
subsidies lead to crowding-out effects and that without them more 
employment services would be provided on a (fully) commercial basis. The 
main justification for subsidies is that without them disadvantaged groups 
may not have sufficient access to the employment services anymore. 
Furthermore, in a completely privatized system a general underinvestment 
in training of the unemployed may occur. And finally some measures, such 
as wage subsidies, are by definition government measures4. 
 
 
                                                     
4 Already in the 1990s temporary wage subsidies in the Netherlands were put in the 
form of exemptions from social security payments and of reduced tax rates. There was 
no involved of the employment offices in it anymore. Recently, most of these schemes 
were abolished. Subsidized labour still exists in the form of special arrangements for 
the handicapped and local job creation schemes.  
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 Table 1 Organizations involved in social security and active labour 
market policy in the Netherlands 
Organization (in 
Dutch) 
English equivalent Task Status 
Arbeidsvoorziening Public employment 
service (not in 
existence anymore) 
Increase labour market 
transparency  
Job brokerage  
Implementation of active labour 
market policy 
Public 
CWI: Centrum voor 
Werk en Inkomen 
Centre for Work and 
Income (the new 
public employment 
agency) 
Profiling 
Increase labour market 
transparency, 
Assistance with submitting an 
application for unemployment 
benefits 
Job mediation 
Public 
UVI: 
Uitvoeringsorganisatie 
sociale zekerheid 
Social Security 
Agency (now merged 
into UWV)  
Organized on a 
sectoral basis 
Provide benefits to the 
unemployed and the disabled; 
Outsource reintegration 
services to private providers 
Public 
Lisv: Landelijk 
Instituut Sociale 
Verzekeringen 
National Institute for 
Social Insurance 
(now merged into 
UWV) 
Former regulating body in 
social security 
Public 
UWV: Uitvoering 
Werknemers-
verzekeringen  
Employee Insurance 
Programs Agency 
Provide benefits to the 
unemployed and the disabled; 
Merger of former UVIs 
Outsource reintegration 
services to private providers 
Public 
RWI: Raad voor Werk 
en Inkomen 
Council for Work and 
Income  
Involves the social 
partners 
Give advise to the government 
on active labour market policy 
Public 
Gemeentelijke sociale 
dienst 
Municipal social 
service 
Provide social assistance 
benefits;  
Outsource reintegration 
services to private providers 
Public 
Reïntegratiebedrijf Reintegration firm  Offer services such as training 
and/or placement services for 
the unemployed and the 
disabled 
Private 
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 3 CENTRES FOR WORK AND INCOME 
In the new structure a Public Employment Service still exists but its tasks 
are reduced compared to the old situation. The employment offices are still 
there but are now called Centres for Work and Income. This new name 
suggests that they also provide benefits, but this is not the case. They only 
check the entitlement of clients to an employment benefit and refer them to 
the appropriate benefit agency (the UWV or a municipality). There are 
approximately 130 CWIs spread over the country, administered by a central 
organization (also called CWI). There are slightly less than 500 
municipalities, implying that most of the CWIs have to work together with 
several municipalities. There are also six district CWI offices playing an 
intermediary role between the central and the local level of the CWI 
organization. 
When a new client registers, the CWI: 
− determines to which category the client belongs (profiling). The 
categories indicate the ‘distance’ of the client to the labour market; 
− refers the client to the appropriate benefit agency for a reintegration 
pathway when the client is in high risk of long-term unemployment. 
The referral is accompanied by an advise about the content of the 
pathway. 
Clients not in high risk of long-term unemployment have only access to the 
basic services as provided by the CWIs. CWIs, just like the former 
employment offices, register both jobseekers and vacancies. In the available 
data system, employers can search for staff and jobseekers can look for 
vacancies. A lot of it is based on the principle of self-service although CWI 
counsellors also provide additional services. These services are mainly for 
unemployed jobseekers such as advise in job search strategies and 
assistance in using the largely computerized tools available in the centres. 
In the current situation, where unemployment is rising, priorities tend to 
shift again towards the employer in trying to register and fill as many 
vacancies as possible. Counsellors make visits to companies to induce them 
to notify vacancies. Furthermore, on request the CWIs make selections of 
registered jobseekers matching the requirements of the vacancy as notified 
by an employer. 
So, one could say that the information and job brokerage functions of the 
former public employment services have largely remained intact. However, 
the CWIs are not allowed to provide intensive job counselling services or 
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 training for clients that cannot be directly placed in the labour market5. 
Neither do the CWIs have opportunities to train unemployed clients to 
reduce mismatch on the labour market or to train workers in danger of 
losing their jobs6. Clients that need services extending the provision of 
information and job brokerage are sent to the benefit agency (the UWV or 
the municipality, depending on the type of benefit one is entitled to), which 
then becomes responsible for the reintegration. They must outsource 
implementation of the reintegration to private reintegration firms.  
We already mentioned the fact that the CWIs profile new entrants into 
unemployment. This process implies that every new client is put in one of 
the four possible categories. Category 1 consists of clients that are expected 
to find a job soon without special help. They are only entitled to the 
services as provided by the CWI. If after 6 months a category 1 client is still 
unemployed, he or she is sent to the benefit agency after all for participation 
in special pathways. For categories 2, 3 and 4 it is already clear at an early 
stage of the unemployment period that they need more assistance. They are 
sent to the appropriate benefit agency directly after the profiling. For each 
of these clients the CWIs gives an advice concerning the content of the 
reintegration pathway, but this advice is not binding. Category 4 consists of 
clients with severe social and health problems that need to be solved before 
job counselling or training comes in sight. Categories 2 and 3 hold an 
intermediate position. For category 2 clients job counselling aiming at 
placing them in regular jobs is the most common procedure. For category 3, 
placement in a subsidized job will be more common. Training is also an 
option (in fact, for all three categories), but tends to be applied less 
frequently. The benefit agency is responsible for the reintegration and has 
the funding for diagnosis, job counselling, training, subsidized jobs or 
combinations of these options (subsidized jobs only for municipalities, not 
for the UWV). It must outsource implementation of the reintegration plans 
to private reintegration plans using procurement procedures. The CWIs 
cannot act as service providers in this field and cannot compete for these 
contracts. Category 2, 3 and 4 clients can still make use of the general 
services as provided by the CWIs, however. 
                                                     
5 The CWIs do provide training in job search, however. 
6 Until recently the RWI possessed a training fund for employers wishing to train an 
unemployed person. However, recently this scheme was abolished. 
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 The profiling system currently in use is not validated7. Benefit agencies 
criticize the CWIs on the quality of the assessments made. Therefore, the 
tendency is that the assessment is repeated by the benefit agency, and 
sometimes again by the reintegration firm hired by the benefit agency. As 
we will argue later the lack of a good profiling system is an important 
weakness of the new system. Starting from January 2004 CWIs are allowed 
to make alternative arrangements with the municipalities about how to 
proceed with the profiling. It will be possible that municipalities take over 
responsibility for the profiling. The arrangements made may differ locally. 
Currently, the central CWI organization is thinking about a new approach to 
deal with its clients. Although we lack detailed information about it, the 
new approach seems to imply that profiling will no longer take place. 
According to these ideas clients can be referred to the benefit agency if they 
are still unemployed after at least three months, but before one year in 
unemployment has expired (in order to satisfy the rule that every 
unemployed person receives a job or training offer before reaching one year 
in unemployment). The judgments of the counsellor will probably become 
decisive for the routing of the client. 
The CWIs have a broader task in providing information on labour market 
and training opportunities. They also offer services in the field of 
occupational choice and career guidance. Furthermore, they commission 
studies in the field of labour market analysis and forecasting to help making 
the labour market more transparent. And finally they took over from the old 
employment offices the duties concerning lay-offs and work permits for 
foreign workers. The main difference with the old situation is that the 
centres do not have the funding anymore for training and other specific 
reintegration measures. 
Increasing the transparency of the labour market is one of the principal aims 
of the CWIs. Furthermore, job brokerage still belongs to their core business. 
An interesting question is then how the market shares of the CWIs in terms 
of vacancy registration and vacancy filling compare to the former 
‘Arbeidsvoorziening’. Every year a survey is held among companies 
containing questions about the use of different recruitment channels. It 
appears that the use of the CWIs as a recruitment channel by companies has 
                                                     
7 In the 1990s, still under the old system, the profiling was partly based on a statistical 
profiling system (De Koning, 1999). For a more general discussion of profiling 
systems, see OECD (1998). However, when the new structure came into existence 
updating this system no longer had priority. 
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 continuously diminished since 1994 (CWI, 2003)8. In that year 22 per cent 
of the companies used the CWIs (then still called employment offices); in 
2002 it was only 8 per cent. In the filling rate no clear pattern can be 
observed. It fell considerably in 2001, perhaps as a result of the new 
structure, but recovered in 2000 to 59 per cent, which was only slightly less 
than in the mid-1990s. Recently, SEOR has done a comparative study into 
the way public employment offices in EU countries (and some other 
European countries, including the countries that will enter the Union next 
year) deal with vacancies (Van Nes, Korolkova and De Koning, 
forthcoming). For what purposes do they register vacancies, how do they 
register them, how high is their market share, etc? Although the figures are 
not always easily comparable, it appears that the market share of the Dutch 
public employment service is on the low side. One of the reasons is that, 
unlike Norway for example, the Dutch PES cannot use newspaper 
advertisements without payment (for which it has no budget). Furthermore, 
the frequent changes in the organization and the institutional context may 
have taken their toll. In countries with more continuity in the role and the 
organization of the PES, this organization tends to have a higher market 
share in terms of vacancy registration. However, is a high market share of 
the PES necessary for it to perform its role adequately? The quality of the 
services provided by the PES and the types of clients to which the services 
are provided, may be more important. The drop in the market share may be 
due to the favourable labour market development. When employment is low 
employers tend to make less use of the PES. 
4 THE PROCUREMENT OF REINTEGRATION 
SERVICES BY THE SOCIAL INSURANCE AGENCIES9 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we evaluate the procurement of reintegration services as 
conducted by the social insurances agencies or UVIs. We concentrate on 
the 2001 procurement round, as most information is available for this round 
(section 4.2). We deal with the basic design, the procurement procedure, the 
criteria to choose between providers as well as the score function, and the 
bidding process. We also give an evaluation of the design and discuss the 
                                                     
8 The increasing use of the Internet is not responsible as other recruitment channels do 
not show such a structural decrease. 
9 Partly based on Dykstra and De Koning (2004). 
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 outcomes. The 2002 and 2003 procurement procedures are discussed in 
section 4.3. The conclusions are summarised in section 2.4. 
4.2 THE 2001 PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE 
4.2.1  BASIC DESIGN FEATURES 
The 2001 procurement procedure was held in 2000 and the contracts came 
into effect in 2001. The Lisv developed a set of rules for the competitive 
procurement of reintegration services. The UVIs were compelled to follow 
this procurement procedure when purchasing reintegration trajectories. In 
the year 2000 the first procurement round was held. 
The reintegration firms bid on a lot consisting of clients who have to be 
reintegrated. In their bids, they describe the reintegration services they will 
deliver in order to reintegrate these clients and the price for these services. 
The procedure contained no specific requirements for the description of the 
lots. In the lot descriptions the UVIs only defined the groups of clients and 
the number of clients per lot. The clients were in most cases classified by 
industry sector, region and if they were unemployed or disabled. Generally, 
the composition of the lots was therefore very heterogeneous. This made it 
next to impossible to make fine tuned bids for niche markets. Only in a few 
cases, the lots consisted of a narrowly defined group of clients. In order to 
make such lots sufficiently large, these lots were however not classified by 
region.  
The Lisv defines a number of criteria on the basis of which the bids must be 
judged. These refer to both the price and the quality of the services. 
Therefore, the procurement procedure can be seen as a beauty contest. In 
case of an auction, a detailed set of quality requirements by the Lisv and the 
UVIs would have been needed, particularly in terms of the output 
(minimum standards for placements results of more or less homogeneous 
groups)10. Then, the bidding would have referred to the price only. Later in 
the paper we come back to the question whether an auction is to be 
preferred over a beauty contest. 
                                                     
10  Furthermore, sub-categories can be distinguished within both the class of auctions and 
that of beauty contests. See the introduction in Janssen (ed.), 2004. 
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 4.2.2 PROCEDURE 
The Lisv procurement procedure, generally speaking, follows that of the 
European Service Directive. The UVIs can choose from two procedures: an 
open procedure and a restricted one11.  
In the open procedure the reintegration firms can directly make a proposal 
based on the request for proposal, which were made public in the national 
Dutch newspapers. The UVI must then choose the winning bid from all 
proposals offered. The bids are first evaluated according to certain 
qualifying criteria. The intention of the qualifying criteria is to weed out 
those firms, which – so the UVIs expect – cannot handle the trajectories 
successfully. The bids that pass this test are then evaluated according to the 
bidding criteria.  
In the restricted procedure there are two phases: pre-qualification and the 
contest itself. In the first phase the reintegration firms can show their 
interest for one or more lots. Based on the qualifying criteria, which were 
made public, each of the UVIs select a minimum of 5 reintegration firms, 
which are granted the opportunity to make a competitive bid. From these 
bids each UVI chooses the winning bid, based on the bidding criteria. 
Two UVIs (Gak and Cadans) used only the open procedure, while Guo, Sfb 
and Uszo, used only the restricted procedure. Because Gak and Cadans are 
by far the largest UVIs, this resulted in more than 80 percent of the 
competition for the trajectories being conducted according to the open 
procedure. 
The Lisv prescribed certain qualifying criteria to the UVIs. These were 
basically the same as the bidding criteria. The UVIs were free to add more 
qualifying criteria. In most cases only very formal criteria were added. Gak 
for instance added several dozen of formal criteria. If a bid failed on one of 
these criteria it was ruled out. In addition Gak also took a very formal 
stance. If the slightest piece of information was missing from the bid, it 
could not be added later.  
                                                     
11  Additionally the Lisv procurement procedure opens the possibility for an experimental 
procedure. In this procedure it is possible to grant a maximum of 2 contracts to bids 
which – by the rules of the game did not fulfil all the criteria or come out as winners. 
The Lisv wanted to give the UVIs the possibility for experimentation with procuring 
reintegration trajectories for clients who are extremely difficult to place in the labour 
market. The value of these contracts may not be more than € 201.000. Taking account 
of the fact that in total some three hundred millions of euros was involved in the 
procurement procedure, this experimental procedure plays a very small role in the 
course of affairs.  
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 The procedure as implemented by Gak misses the goal it was meant for, 
namely to select the credible bids. It is questionable in how far there is a 
correlation between the degree of having ones paper work in tip-top shape 
and the credibility of ones bid. We expect that the marginal value of 
information gained through adding additional criteria will quickly diminish. 
Applying many formal criteria then becomes an inefficient procedure in 
assessing the credibility of bids. The procedure also carries high 
administrative costs for firms bidding as well as for the Gak. 
Other UVIs took a much more relaxed viewpoint. Certain omitted items 
could be added to the file later on in the process. The widely differing 
procedure leads to the fact that similar bids are treated in very different 
fashion. These differences are harmful for the transparency of the market. 
This is illustrated by the fact that more than 80 percent of firms that did not 
pre-qualify believe that the UVIs committed errors in the pre-qualification 
procedure (Vinke and Cremer, 2001). 
The open procedure has the advantage of generating a large number of bids, 
which in itself enhances competition. With each additional bid the chance 
of finding a very high quality one increases. The mirror side is that the 
chance of winning a bid is relatively low for an individual firm. It then 
makes sense for a bidder not to put too much effort in the bid. This will 
reduce the quality of the bids made. An additional disadvantage of the open 
procedure is that the process is much costlier. This applies for both the 
reintegration firms and the UVIs. The reintegration firms have to make 
more complete bids than is the case in a restricted process. In addition, for 
the bids to be qualifiable all formal requirements have to be fulfilled. This 
results in extra administrative burden The UVIs in turn have to examine 
more bids fully. This also results in higher administrative costs.  
All lots were put up for sale simultaneously. This resulted in a large amount 
of work that had to be done in a short period of time for the reintegration 
firms as well as the UVIs. One can thus expect the tendency to arise that 
both bids and evaluations will be quick and dirty, resulting in low quality 
bids and low quality evaluations. 
Even though the UVIs explicitly requested for bids for specific sub-lots, the 
reintegration firms have barely made such offers. Nearly all bids were made 
for the entire lot. Attempts to show a certain affinity with specific groups of 
clients within a lot could hardly be discerned from the bids made12. 
                                                     
12 KPMG/BEA (2001). 
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 4.2.3 CRITERIA AND SCORE FUNCTION  
The Lisv procedure defined five bidding criteria: four quality criteria 
(‘expertise personnel’, ‘results achieved in the past’, ‘throughput time’, and 
‘percentage of clients placed in job’) and price. The UVIs were not 
permitted to add extra criteria. However, they were allowed to stipulate the 
bidding criteria more specifically. Each UVI made additional specifications 
to the bidding criteria. Despite the Lisv stating that UVIs were not allowed 
to add extra criteria, which are not in line with the criteria as set out by the 
Lisv, Gak and Guo added one criterion, namely the dropout rate.  
It is highly improbable that the ranking of the bidders on each criterion is 
the same. Some bidders might offer higher quality, while others may try to 
compensate a (somewhat) lower quality with a lower price. Therefore, one 
needs to have some kind of weighting procedure or score function to come 
to a decision. 
Next, we discuss the criteria and the score function in more detail. We 
group the criteria into four categories: structural criteria (‘expertise 
personnel’ and ‘results achieved in the past’), structural criteria 
(‘throughput time’ and ’drop-out rate’), performance criteria (‘placement 
results’) and price. 
Structural criteria 
The criteria ‘expertise personnel’, and ‘results achieved in the past’ refer 
primarily to the bidding reintegration firm. These criteria are rather signals 
of quality than actual quality. They signal whether or not the reintegration 
firm can do the job or not if it wins the bidding competition.  
When assessing the structural features the UVIs placed very different 
weights on expertise personnel and results achieved in the past. According 
to KPMG/BEA (2001) Cadans put much more value on expertise on 
personnel, while on the other extreme Gak did not value expertise at all, but 
only looked at results in the past. The other three UVIs held intermediate 
views. 
Process criteria 
The criteria ‘throughput time’ and ‘drop-out rate’ provide characterisations 
of how the reintegration firm handles the reintegration process of its clients 
in the case it wins the lot. 
The Lisv procedure contained no specific definition of the criterion 
‘throughput time’. Consequently, the UVIs and the reintegration firms 
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 defined it very differently. Some UVIs and reintegration firms defined 
throughput time as the entire time between registration of the client up to 
placement of the client in a paid job, excluding time spent on education and 
training. For others, however, it relates to the waiting time between the 
various stages of the process. To us the most straightforward definition of 
throughput time is the length of period during which the UVIs is dealing 
with the client, i.e. the time it takes to place a client. To say the least, it is 
remarkable that this criterion was not defined. This makes comparison 
between bids hard to do. 
The drop-out-rate is the percentage of clients, which for some reason leave 
the trajectory prematurely. Two of the UVIs, Gak and Guo, used this 
criterion, which was not included in the list specified by the Lisv. 
Therefore, Gak and Guo acted against the rules as developed by the Lisv. It 
is not clear why this criterion was added. From previous evaluations of 
labour market measures we know that often participants leave a measure 
owing to the fact that they found a job (De Koning et al, 2002). This is 
particularly so in case of training measures. Therefore, dropout does not 
always point to a problem. 
Performance criteria 
The procedure defines only one performance criterion: the percentage of 
people placed in job. The Lisv defined placement to be the case when the 
trajectory of the client results in client working in paid employment for a 
period of at least 6 months. From the supplemental explanation given by 
Lisv it becomes clear that the definition refers to the signing of an 
employment contract by a client for that period and not that of actually 
working for that stretch of time.  
In a bid the reintegration firm has to specify the percentage of clients it 
believes it will place within one year13. The bidder has to state that he can 
place a minimum of 35 percent of the clients in paid employment.  
Price 
In the Lisv procedure price is defined rather loosely as the price of an 
average trajectory. Most bidders - in their bids - simply present a list of 
products and services, which can be used in the trajectories of clients. The 
                                                     
13 The period of one year is counted separately for each individual client. The period 
starts at the moment that the mediation plan of an individual has been approved by the 
UVI. The period also does not include time spent on educational activities. 
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 number and kind of products and services will vary per client. The Lisv 
expects the UVIs to make an educated estimate of the quantity and quality 
of the necessary products and services for the clients in the particular lot. 
The bidders do not have to quote an average price. They only have to quote 
price per product and service. 
Score function 
The decision procedure is typical for an un-weighted beauty contest. 
− The score per attribute is determined judgmental. Ratings reflect the 
subjective views of the awarding authority. 
− The total score is determined judgmental. Ratings reflect the 
subjective views of the awarding authority. 
− There is no exact representation of the relationships between the 
attributes. 
− Bidders do not know the exact algorithm used by the awarding 
authority to calculate the total score. 
The Lisv determines the winner to be determined on the basis of the most 
economic bid. What most economic bid means or how it should be made 
operational is however not prescribed or described. The evaluations also do 
not make clear how the UVIs tackled this problem. The evaluation by 
KPMG/BEA (2001) suggests that the UVIs had some sort of weighting for 
the attributes. From the evaluations, however, it does not become clear 
whether the UVIs adopted weights, or what these weights were. In each 
case, the bidders did not know them at the time of bidding.  
4.2.4 BIDDING 
The format used 
The format of the competition is a simultaneous sealed bid type. In this 
format each bidder places only one bid. The bidders present bids in a sealed 
envelope which are opened publicly at a pre-specified time by the awarding 
authority. The bid includes both offers on quality and on price. The winning 
bidder is obliged to produce the services at the offered level of quality and 
price. 
In general the more information that is provided in the bidding competition 
the more transparent is the contest and the better-informed bids can be 
made. A disadvantage of the simultaneous sealed bid format is that it 
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 precludes bidders learning from one another14. Bidders have no information 
on other bidders’ estimates of the value of a particular lot. This can give rise 
to the so-called “winner’s curse”. The winning bidder is the unfortunate one 
who, out of ignorance underestimates the costs of the lot. In order to 
decrease the possibility of making a loss on the particular lot, bidders will 
adjust their quality bids downwards and their price bids upwards15.  
If bidders are inexperienced, they may be less likely to correct for winner’s 
curse, which may yield a high quality and low price bid. An additional 
reason why inexperienced bidders may offer high quality and low price is 
exacerbated by the fact that newcomers have little working experience to 
show in the area of reintegration. Working experience is one of the criteria 
on which the bids are judged. In order to make competitive bids newcomers 
will have to especially compete on other quality criteria than working 
experience and on price. 
However, an internal note from the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment suggest that bidders were quite informed about the prices of 
their competitors. It says that the smaller reintegration firms were simply 
following the price set by the market leaders, that is the former public 
reintegration firms. Therefore, the problem of the winner’s curse may not 
be that important in this case. If the Ministry’s note is right, we may doubt 
whether the price has played an important role in the procedure at all. 
Other possible formats 
The only format used by the UVIs was the simultaneous sealed bid format. 
Besides this format other ones may be possible such as a sequential format. 
In this format first a quality bid is made and in a second stage a price bid is 
made. The second stage can be conducted in two ways: as a one-off 
financial bid or as one in which sequentially higher price bids can be 
placed. 
The format with the one-off financial bid resembles a sealed bid auction 
with a bid handicap, while the format with the sequentially higher price bids 
resembles an English auction with a bid handicap. In both formats ones’ 
                                                     
14  In the restricted procedure the UVI makes a short list of bidders. If the awarding 
authority informs the bidders which firms have been short-listed this can be of some 
aid to the bidders. They at least know whom they are bidding against. In the open 
procedure even this information is lacking. 
15  A lower quality bid implies lower placement rate, higher throughput time and higher 
drop-out rate. 
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 quality score in relation to the highest quality score bid determines the bid 
handicap. 
The main advantage of these formats is that they provide much more 
information to the bidders. Besides knowing which parties are partaking in 
the bidding, the bidders also know how the others have scored on the 
quality dimension. This knowledge can be used in the financial bid. An 
additional advantage is that these formats should reduce the danger of the 
winner’s curse arising. In comparison to the simultaneous sealed bid format 
this will lead to higher quality and lower prices being bid for the 
trajectories.  
A favourable feature of sealed bid formats over open bid formats is that 
sealed bid formats are generally considered less prone to collusion between 
bidders. Bidder’s defections from collusive agreements (that is the 
submission of a bid with higher quality and/or lower price than the 
collusive agreement) are harder for other bidders to prevent in a closed 
format than in open bidding system. The danger of collusion arising is 
probably quite low. The reason is the sheer number of lots (several 
hundred) put on the market in combination with the large number of 
bidders. This combination makes it highly unlikely that stable collusive 
agreements will come about. In the case the tender procedure used is open 
the likelihood of collusion occurring will be even smaller than when using 
the restricted procedure, due to the larger number of bidders per lot. 
A possible disadvantage of the sequential formats in comparison to the 
simultaneous one are the costs involved. The costs for conducting the 
sequential open format for both the UVI and the reintegration firm are 
likely to be higher than the costs involved using the simultaneous format. 
The costs for the simultaneous sealed bid format and the sequential sealed 
bid format will presumably not differ strongly. For some bidders it may in 
fact be cost saving. When being informed about the quality scores of their 
competitors they may quickly make the decision to opt out and not make a 
price bid. 
4.2.5 EVALUATION OF DESIGN 
The quality criteria are very different by nature. The structural criteria relate 
to the supplier and only indirectly to the product or service, while the 
performance criteria relate directly to the product. Put differently, structural 
features are means by which a goal can be achieved. It is the performance, 
one could argue, that matters. However, it is also important whether the 
promised performance is credible. If one bidder promises better outcomes 
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 than the other, but the latter seems to be more reliable on the basis of its 
experience and track record, one might choose the more reliable candidate.  
However, if too much weight were put on structural features, newcomers 
would stand no chance. The very purpose of the procurement procedure is 
to increase competition by offering new providers a chance. From this 
perspective it is odd that the largest UVI, Gak, put so much emphasis on 
previous results achieved by reintegration firms. This effectively shut out 
newcomers. The Cadans approach, which focused more on the experience 
of a reintegration firm’s staff, seems to be more reasonable. Newcomers can 
and in fact did attract experienced staff from former public and private 
providers. Therefore, the last mentioned approach seems to offer the best 
compromise between introducing effective competition on the one hand, 
and on the other ensuring that a winning firm has the capacity to operate 
successfully. 
The fact that competition was only increased to a limited extent is one 
drawback of the design used. A second drawback is unclear definition of 
criteria. Particularly unclear is what is meant by throughput time. As to the 
placement results a minimum figure of 35 per cent within one year was 
required. However, this figure seems to be extremely low. In the case of 
unemployed clients, even clients that are not treated have a higher chance of 
finding a job16. Therefore, the minimum percentage of 35 does not mean a 
lot. The third drawback is that it is unclear how the UVIs weighted the 
score on the various criteria.  
Also regarding the implementation of the procedure weak points can be 
mentioned. First, in the rules that the Lisv developed the qualifying and 
bidding criteria were mixed up. UVIs could add qualifying criteria to the 
ones prescribed by Lisv, but in practice only formal ones were added. The 
largest UVI did this to the point that formal qualifying criteria received 
more weight than the bidding criteria. 
A second weak point in the implementation is the fact that with the 
exception of a few cases the lots were defined for heterogeneous groups of 
clients, such as ‘the’ unemployed or ‘the’ disabled. It was therefore not 
                                                     
16 An evaluation of measures co-funded under the European Social Fund (ESF) reveals 
that in the period 1997-1998 placements rates were 50 per cent or higher (De Koning 
et al, 1999). It should be noted that in the years following 1998 the labour market 
further improved. In 2001 the labour market conditions were such that even 
disadvantaged groups could be placed relatively easy. However, soon after the 
situation changed and unemployment increased rapidly. Nowadays, reintegration firms 
have a hard time placing their clients. 
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 possible to make fine tuned bids for niche markets. With these 
heterogeneous lots the danger of cherry picking seems to be real. Making 
pay dependent on placement results might have reduced this risk, but the 
contracts contain few, if any, of such incentives for the reintegration firms. 
The more heterogeneous the content of a lot is the greater is the uncertainty 
of the bidder about the value of the lot. In order to prevent the winner’s 
curse arising, the reintegration firm will bid lower on quality and higher on 
price. As a result, bids may actually yield a lower quality and higher price 
and thus higher costs for the UVIs than in the case relatively homogenous 
lots were put up for sale. 
All in all we are bound to conclude that beauty contest design and 
implementation reflect serious flaws.  
4.2.6 OUTCOME BIDDING PROCESS 
Expertise personnel 
Whether or not a certain affinity with a specific sub-group of clients could 
be shown barely influenced the final score in the bid assessment of four of 
the five UVIs (all but Guo). This point was never made specific as an 
explicit criterion. With regard to experience of personnel or results achieved 
in the past, the point was in a few instances raised. These minor points were 
however insufficient for a bidder to clearly distinguish itself from a 
competitor on these grounds. An innovative niche player thus has little 
opportunity to identify himself as such. This makes it problematic to 
achieve the objective of increasing the number of innovative niche players. 
Eliciting information 
The UVIs put several hundred lots up for sale. This should give them ample 
opportunity to acquire information from the bids. This kind of information 
increases the transparency of the market. UVIs obtain more insight in the 
costs of integration services for various types of clients. However due to the 
fact that the contents of the individual lots are very heterogeneous and ill 
defined it is difficult to compare bids between lots. Bids can then only be 
compared one lot at a time. This limits the amount of information that can 
be elicited from the bids. More information could be elicited from the bids 
if the lots were defined more tightly and made more homogenous. With 
closer defined product combinations the costs for each such combination 
becomes better known. Instead of being a rich data source the large number 
of lots then become a costly low information affair. The poor definition of 
the lots is thus a missed opportunity for increasing the transparency of the 
market. 
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 Fallacious comparisons 
The procedure is rigged against firms specialising in difficult market 
segments; i.e. with clients that are difficult to place. The results for these 
difficult market segments are low while the costs are high. When these 
offers are compared to other bids, which involve a mix of easy and difficult 
groups of clients, and the evaluator does not account for these different 
mixes, the bids of specialised firms will be turned down. Taken at face 
value the results of the specialised firms are worse while their price is 
higher. This obviously is a fallacious comparison. 
Lack of quality specification  
The lack of quality specification results in cherry picking. Since the 
reintegration firms are accountable on a total percentage of all trajectories 
within a lot it makes sense from a cost perspective if reintegration firms 
conduct as little as possible effort in the high cost trajectories. As little as 
possible is then a minimum set up in the contract or it can be some self-
imposed minimum, which makes them credible to the UVIs. 
Difficulties for entrants 
It can be easily argued that entrants in this market for reintegration services 
have less information about which groups are more difficult or relatively 
easy to reintegrate in the labour market. Incumbents have more experience 
in this respect. This makes it that it is easier for incumbents to pick the 
cherries than for entrants. Accordingly, newcomers tend to have higher 
prices so that innovation does not come about so easily. 
Tackling cherry picking 
The present approach to cherry picking is by means of regulation and 
monitoring. A simpler approach would be to ensure that cherry picking 
simply couldn’t come about. This is the case of perfectly homogenous 
groups. In homogenous groups there are simply no cherries to be picked. 
All group members are identical. Of course some degree of heterogeneity 
will always exist within a group. In making lots on which can be bid it is 
essential to strive for clients having the same background characteristics. 
These can be education, age, sex, profession, physical handicap, 
psychological handicap etc. In order to achieve homogeneity it may be 
necessary to make small groups. The question, of course, is whether it is 
possible to identify and measure all the relevant factors that determine job 
chances. We come back to this point in section 5. 
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 Market outcomes 
Until 1998 Gak-Labour market integration (Gak-Lmi, a branch of Gak) 
conducted the reintegration of disabled people to a new employer. In 1998 
Gak-Lmi was separated from Gak and placed within the PES. The UVIs 
were compelled to buy a minimum of 80 percent of the trajectories from the 
PES. The other trajectories could be bought from private reintegration 
firms.  
We do not know the exact market shares in 1999 per reintegration firm. It is 
nevertheless obvious that major shifts in shares have taken place. A few 
years ago Kliq, which then was part of the PES, was virtually monopolist. 
Its drop in market share has continued in 2000. The other former public 
reintegration firms Argonaut (ex- Gak) en Abp witnessed increasing market 
shares in 2000. Most of the firms which were operating in the market in 
1999 won a number of trajectories in 2000.  
In total 36 percent of trajectories were contracted to the former public 
reintegration firms. The degree in which UVIs have contracted trajectories 
to the former public reintegration firms varies from 10 percent for Cadans 
to 57% for Uszo. 
The fear that reintegration firms, which were formerly part of the UVIs, 
would be favoured is partly justified. In the case of Gak, Uszo and Guo the 
reintegration firms receiving the largest number of trajectories are the 
former partners (Argonaut, ABP Reïntegratie and Relan respectively). Sfb 
and Cadans haven’t dished out trajectories to their former partners. 
Remarkable newcomers are Alexander Calder, Serin, Fourstar and Creyfs 
Interim. Cadans has by far contracted the most newcomers, which is not 
surprising given the fact that this UVI attached little weight to past results. 
4.2.7 FEATURES AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SERVICES PROVIDED 
Hardly anything is known about the services provided. A study by Heyma 
et al (2003) is the only available source. This study was commissioned by 
the RWI to investigate how lots could be substantiated using data on the 
characteristics of individual clients, the provision of services to these clients 
and their ex-ante job entry chances. The data apply to clients that entered 
unemployment or disability in 2000 or 2001, implying that a considerable 
part was reintegrated under the ‘old’ regime. Table 2 gives the available 
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 information on the types of services provided. The information is given for 
two types of clients: the unemployed and the disabled17. 
In the table clients are categorized according to the services provided to 
them. For some of them only a diagnosis was made. Others received a wide 
range of services. A problem with this information is that we do not exactly 
know what the various terms mean. The term ‘strengthening’, for example, 
is a literal translation of the Dutch word ‘versterking’. Heyma et al suggest 
that ‘strengthening’ may also include certain types of training18. Probably, 
training provided to unemployed clients is mostly job search training. Job-
related training aiming at increasing a person’s job competences seems to 
have been applied to the disabled more frequently, although we lack further 
information. 
Table 2 Types of services provided to clients in 2000 and 2001 
(percentage of the clients to which a specific set of services 
was offered) 
Type of services Unemployed Disabled 
Diagnosis 
Training 
Practical experience 
Job mediation 
Strengthening 
Training and strengthening 
Strengthening and job 
mediation  
Training, strengthening and 
job mediation 
Total 
5%
0%
-
15%
38%
7%
19%
16%
100%
11% 
29% 
2% 
31% 
10% 
17% 
- 
 
- 
100% 
  
We refer to the set of services provided to a client as ‘the product’. 
According Heyma et al the average price of the products is € 1052 for 2000 
                                                     
17 The term ‘disabled’ may suggest that the persons involved have a serious (physical or 
mental) health problem. Although this is indeed the case for many of them, there is 
also a considerable number that is (again) able to work and can be re-integrated in the 
labour market. 
18 Heyma et al make a distinction between training and schooling, but do not define 
these terms. 
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 and € 1232 for 2001. We don’t know why the average price has increased 
so much between the two years. Without further information it would not be 
right to blame it on the new procedure. It may also have to do with a change 
in the composition of the client group and a need for more expensive 
instruments. It is important to note that training costs are not included in the 
prices. This information is not available. But on the basis of what we know 
we can conclude that at least in those cases where no training was provided 
the average service provision cannot have been very intensive. 
Of the total group of clients falling under the 2001 procurement procedure, 
approximately one-third found a job, which is almost the same as the 
minimum requirement made by Lisv. Given the fact that Heyma et al use 
data on people starting their benefit period in 2000 and 2001 and assume 
that treatment takes place six months after entering unemployment, their 
analysis of the placement results largely applies to reintegration under the 
‘old regime’. On the basis of their data they find that 43 per cent of the 
unemployed clients treated, found a job within one year after entering 
employment; for the disabled this is 25 per cent. So, although Heyma deal 
with a somewhat different population, the two sources point to similar 
placement results. However, given the differences it is not possible to make 
an exact comparison. 
It is also difficult to compare these placement results with the results found 
in earlier evaluations. In the latter evaluations the post-programme job entry 
rates found are usually higher, but the participants involved, the labour 
market measures involved and the data collection methods used are 
different. So, basically we don’t know what the impact of the privatisation 
on the placement results has been. 
4.3 THE 2002 AND 2003 PROCEDURES 
In the mean time, the UVIs have merged into one organization called 
UWV. Owing to this merger there is much more uniformity in the 2002 and 
2003 procurement procedures, even though the 2002 procedure was still 
conducted by each UVI separately. 
For 2002 this uniformity did not mean less complexity. The number of lots 
was no less than 572. Firstly, 53 target groups were defined. Secondly, each 
of the six UWV districts had a separate procurement procedure. And 
finally, often a target group in a district was divided in a number of 
trenches. Taking into account that the estimated number of clients was not 
higher than 60.000, the conclusion is that on average the lots are very small. 
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 In total 41 providers were contracted, often for a number of lots. On 
average a provider deals with approximately 1500 clients. However, there is 
a huge variation. Some providers deal only with several hundreds of clients, 
while others take charge of thousands of clients. There is no information 
about the placement results for individual providers. Therefore, it is not 
possible to investigate whether size matters to the outcomes. One might 
expect it to be easier for providers with larger market shares to collect 
information about vacancies. Furthermore, companies in search for 
personnel may find it easier to deal with these larger providers as the latter 
offer more choice. On the other hand, smaller providers may be able to 
offer specialized services that are more effective for specific groups of 
clients.  
The large number of lots created practical problems in the selection process. 
According to a process evaluation by the IWI (2002) the regional selection 
committees were unable to deal satisfactory with the applications. Owing to 
that the central level of the UWV organization was dissatisfied with the 
outcomes. A number of providers with a good reputation were not selected, 
which led the central level to adjust the choices made by the regional 
committees. However, the criteria used in the final decision process were 
unclear. Therefore, the IWI has criticized the transparency, the lack of 
uniformity and the efficiency of the selection process. 
However, also the contract arrangements made between the UWV and the 
providers are subject to criticism. Although the contracts make payment 
dependent on performance in principle, there are ways by which providers 
can avoid penalties for poor results. They can, for example, refuse clients 
that do not seem motivated. The IWI states that on the basis of the available 
information cherry picking has probably frequently occurred. However, if 
we compare the 2001, 2002 and 2003 procedures the tendency definitely to 
make payment increasingly dependent on placement results. 
For a number of target groups, contracts with more than one provider have 
been made in the 2002 procedure. In these cases there is room for clients to 
choose between different providers. The choice is made in consultation with 
the case managers who must approve the choice. The freedom of choice is 
limited by the fact that the contracts imply that a provider gets a certain 
number of clients. However, there is a tendency to increase the 
opportunities for clients to choose.  
We can also observe that in the second round of procurement services the 
newcomers seem to have gained a strong market position at the cost of the 
firms associated with the old system such as Kliq. Therefore, in terms of 
market efficiency the situation may have improved, although we lack the 
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 information to be sure of that. The first round still favoured the 
reintegration firms originating from the ‘old’ public organizations in the 
field of social security and employment services.  
On the whole, we tend to conclude that in practice the improvements of the 
2002 procurement procedure compared to the one for 2001 were probably 
small. As to the 2003 procedure we do not yet have information about the 
market outcomes. The description of the 2003 procedure suggests that it is 
simpler and therefore more workable. However, neither for the 2002 nor for 
the 2003 procedure, anything is known about placement results. There is no 
sign that the basic weaknesses have been improved. The UWV still lacks a 
system to determine the ex-ante job entry chances of the clients, that is: the 
job entry chances they would have had without treatment. This information 
is necessary to determine to what extent treatment induces an increase in 
job chances. Neither do we see systematic attempts to make ex-post 
evaluations. The study by Heyma et al shows how it could be done and the 
RWI, which commissioned this study, is a strong advocate for such 
analyses. But so far neither UWV nor the Ministry has changed its attitude 
towards evaluation. The study by Heyma et al also shows how complicated 
the data collection process has become as parts of the data have to be 
obtained from several actors. 
We previously mentioned that the tendency is to make payment to the 
reintegration firms increasingly dependent on (gross) placement results. 
However the disadvantages of such a system have become apparent, now 
that the Dutch labour market situation has seriously deteriorated. The 
number of unemployed has risen sharply and the number of vacancies has 
dropped. In this situation it becomes increasingly difficult for reintegration 
firms to place their clients. Reintegration may not be a profitable activity 
anymore. Furthermore, it is unlikely that under the given circumstances the 
efforts of these firms will result in a short-term reduction of the total 
number of beneficiaries. If they succeed in improving the chances for their 
clients it probably goes at the expense of other categories of jobseekers. 
Owing to this, one can observe the following tendencies: 
− if reintegration does not result in short-term success the tendency is to 
reduce the efforts in this field; 
− there is a tendency to concentrate on services that optically lead to 
short-term success and to cut in types of service provision that are 
more costly and take more time such as training (see Gelderblom, De 
Koning and Zandvliet 2003, and other studies referred to in this 
report); 
− reintegration firms have a hard time in reaching the targets. 
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 There seems to be no awareness of the wider significance of labour market 
programmes and the possibility that they may have important macro-
economic effects. 
4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
A few years ago the government decided to outsource the delivery of 
reintegration services for the unemployed and the disabled to private 
agencies on the basis of a tender procedure. The government’s expectations 
were that by introducing competition the effectiveness and the efficiency of 
the services would be enhanced. On the basis of the available information, 
however, it seems to be unlikely that this goal was indeed achieved. On the 
basis of the previous sections we can at least draw this conclusion for the 
2000 procurement round as conducted by the social security agencies. 
Particularly unsatisfactory are the minimum requirements set regarding the 
job entry rates of the clients. The reintegration firms had to guarantee that at 
least 35 per cent of their clients would be placed in the labour market. 
However, as an average score this is very low. Probably, the same or even a 
higher percentage of the clients involved would have found a job without 
‘treatment’. Recent information about the actual placement figures indicates 
that these will probably not be much higher than the required 35 per cent. 
The lots were in general heterogeneous, which makes the transparency for 
bidders, with regard to what they are exactly bidding on, low. Because lots 
are heterogeneous little can be learned about the costs of different types of 
clients and whether it is cost efficient to specialise in certain client groups 
instead of non-specialisation. The procurement design offers a lot of 
opportunities to reintegration firms for cherry picking or ‘creaming’ as it is 
usually called in the evaluation literature on active labour market policies. 
One might fear that under the present conditions the outsourcing of 
reintegration services to private companies has led to lower chances for the 
most disadvantaged clients. Investigating this point should be an important 
aspect in an ex-post evaluation of the procurement procedure. 
The criteria used by the UVIs to evaluate the bids as well as the weights 
attached to the criteria were unclear. We don’t know to what extent the 
UVIs used a structured decision-making procedure. In any case the 
reintegration firms were not informed about it. In the hypothetical case that 
the same group of firms is bidding on two identical lots offered by two 
UVIs, there is no guarantee that the same firm will win both lots. For a 
contest to be efficient this is.  
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 In addition to obscuring the market rather than making it transparent, the 
procedure also leads to unnecessary costs for bidders. UVIs used different 
procedures and criteria and bidders had to fine-tune their bids to each 
separate UVI. Even for identical lots, bidders will have to provide different 
bids to different UVIs. In certain cases information was asked from bidders 
with very low relevancy to the beauty contest. 
All in all we conclude that instead of enhancing transparency the procedure 
chosen obscured the market. It is difficult to imagine how the procedure 
could have contributed to a more effective and efficient delivery of 
reintegration services. What is also disappointing is that on forehand little 
thought was given to the possibilities of learning from the new procedure. 
One did not make the necessary preparations for an ex-post evaluation that 
could throw light on the net effectiveness of the service provision. Although 
a study comparing content, quality and costs of the various service 
providers is envisaged, the available information may not be sufficient to 
come to reliable conclusions. 
Although the UWV has learned from the experiences in the 2001 procedure 
and made a number of improvements in the 2002 procedure, it is unlikely 
that the latter procedure has produced much better results in practice. 
However, we don’t have any information on the placement results of the 
contracts made under the 2002 procedure. For the 2003 procedure, which 
seems to be more workable than the 2002 procedure, no information on 
outcomes is yet available.  
5 OUTSOURCING OF REINTEGRATION SERVICES BY 
THE MUNICIPALITIES 
A brief description of procurement procedures in six municipalities 
Contrary to the procurement of reintegration services for social insurance 
clients, no common framework exists for the procurement by municipalities 
of reintegration services for social assistance clients. Each municipality has 
its own way of dealing with it and is inventing the wheel. No general 
inventory exists of how municipalities deal with the procurement. In a 
recent study De Koning et al (2003) give a short summary of the situation 
in six municipalities. The main purpose of this study was not, however, to 
analyse procurement procedures. This was a by-product of the study, of 
which the main aim was to develop econometric benchmark analyses to 
compare the performance of municipalities in reducing the number of social 
assistance beneficiaries by activating measures. Both frontier analysis and 
DEA have been used. This work is still in an experimental phase. During 
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 the study in-depth interviews with six municipalities have been held. The 
six consist of three pairs. Each pair of municipalities consists of look-a-
likes in terms of size, regional function and other characteristics. However, 
they differed strongly in one respect: one performed favourably in the 
benchmark and the other unfavourably. One of the purposes of the 
interviews was to find out whether the differences in performance were due 
to specific factors not included in the models. Among the aspects covered in 
the interviews was how the municipalities dealt with their clients and how 
they organized the tendering process for reintegration services. Although 
the sample is very small, the results give some indications. 
Table 3 contains a summary of the results. The results give a clear 
indication of the huge variation in procurement procedures. One 
municipality has even sourced out the assessment of clients. The private 
agencies involved determine what must be done with the clients and 
outsource implementation further to reintegration firms. In this case control 
by the municipality is highly indirect. In other municipalities civil servants 
do the client management and determine the individual need for 
reintegration of their clients and then involve reintegration firms for the 
implementation. In those cases the municipalities keep in direct control. In 
most cases case management is already existing or in development. 
Most contracts with the reintegration firms contain regulations according to 
which a bonus or a penalty can be given, depending on the placement 
results. However, it is also clear that information systems are still far from 
ideal. Few municipalities have a follow-up system on the basis of which 
individual clients can be monitored. In some cases such a system is under 
construction. Placement results are often based on the reporting by the 
reintegration firms. 
Most municipalities have a rather loose way of defining their target groups. 
Ex-ante job entry chances are unknown, implying that placement targets, if 
any, are not based on realistic expectations. None of the six municipalities 
had any idea about the net effectiveness of the reintegration services. 
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Table 3 Characterization of current implementation of reintegration activities 
Municipality Score benchmark-
analysis 1998-2000 
When change to 
procurement 
procedures? 
Characterization of 
procurement procedure
Way of determining 
the target groups 
Role of client 
management 
Information systems Role of incentives 
and testing of 
outcomes 
Municipality 1a Favourable In 2002 Open contracts with six 
reintegration firms; 
each client manager 
can choose from two of 
these firms per client 
group 
Has remained unclear During benefit 
period a client 
keeps the same 
case manager 
No follow-up system 
for clients 
System with bonuses 
and penalties 
Results determined 
on the basis of 
reports by 
reintegration firms 
Municipality 1b Unfavourable In 2002. Still in 
developing phase 
Selection of 
reintegration firms 
partly based on targets 
set by the latter If the 
firms do not reach their 
own target, it gets a 
penalty. Selected firms 
are guaranteed a 
certain number of 
clients to be treated 
Through an analysis 
of the composition of 
the client population; 
not on the basis of job 
entry chances 
Uses CWI 
categorization 
In the process of 
introducing integral 
client management. 
Client manager is 
responsible for all 
aspects of social 
assistance relevant 
to the client 
Different systems 
next to each other. 
No ideal situation.  
Penalty if targets are 
not reached; frequent 
reporting and 
efficiency analyses 
Municipality 2a Favourable In 2001 Beauty contest 
following a European 
tendering procedure 
with five lots 
On the basis of: 
-  CWI; categories 
- REA target group 
Development case 
management in 
progress 
Development client 
follow-up system in 
progress 
System with bonus 
and penalties; results 
determined on the 
basis of reporting by 
reintegration firms. 
Premiums and 
subsidies for clients 
only in case of job 
placement 
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 Municipality Score benchmark-
analysis 1998-2000 
When change to 
procurement 
procedures? 
Characterization of 
procurement procedure
Way of determining 
the target groups 
Role of client 
management 
Information systems Role of incentives 
and testing of 
outcomes 
Municipality 2b Unfavourable Already in period 
1998-2000. In 
2000 new 
organisation 
Parts of reintegration 
pathways purchased 
from different 
providers, both private 
and non-profit 
organizations involved. 
Second procurement 
procedure in operation 
No information Only for 
reintegration; 
before 2001 integral  
case management 
Under development. 
Since January 1 
2003 new system. 
Problems to get 
management 
information 
Business-like 
approach.  Monitoring 
on a monthly basis, 
quarterly progress 
reports and final 
evaluation. Also 
bonuses for clients 
Municipality 3a Favourable Already since 
1998 outsourcing 
to private 
reintegration firms 
Currently procurement 
of complete service 
packages 
Often on the 
individual level by 
case manager. 
Referral of clients to 
reintegration 
individually. No 
overall view (see also 
situation concerning 
IT) 
Integral client 
management. 
Data system on 
benefits and client 
follow-up system 
fairly unrelated. Ad-
hoc solutions  
In principle, pathways 
are only finished 
when the client has 
found a job 
Municipality 3b Unfavourable In 2001 Two main contractors 
responsible for 
diagnosis and case 
management 
Specific reintegration 
activities are 
outsourced further to 
seven reintegration 
firms. Only new clients 
fall under the new 
approach 
On the basis of CWI 
categorization 
Contracted to 
private companies. 
Each client has a 
specific contact 
person in the 
municipal 
department 
Unsatisfactory; 
insufficient 
management 
information. Since 
January 1 2003 new 
system 
Testing of contractual 
arrangements. Main 
contractors are paid 
on the basis of 
performance. The 
latter also pay the 
firms they contract on 
the basis of the 
successfulness of the 
activities carried out 
Table 3 (continued) 
Source: De Koning et al (2003). 
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 A more detailed account of the procurement procedure in one 
municipality 
The previous section only gives a rather superficial account of procurement 
procedures as used by a number of municipalities. However, more detailed 
information is not available. For one (medium-sized) municipality (not 
belonging to the group of six dealt with in the previous section) we dispose 
of an internal paper describing the procurement procedure the municipality 
intends to hold. As an illustration we will treat this procedure in more 
detail. 
The contracts are about the reintegration of 300 clients. The clients are 
divided into 6 lots: 
− category 2 clients (75); 
− category 4 clients of which lone parents (25); 
− disabled clients in category 4(25); 
− category 3 and 4 clients below 23 years of age (25); 
− other clients in category 4 (75); 
− other clients such as clients without a benefit (25). 
Reintegration firms can bid for each lot separately. The contracts refer to a 
period of two years. The procurement procedure is a beauty contest. The 
bids are judged on the basis of price, (50 percent weight), quality (40 per 
cent weight) and degree of acceptance of the plan as set out by the 
municipality (10 per cent weight). Quality is determined by: quality of the 
methods used for the reintegration, placement results, quality of the staff 
and quality control. However, the quality criteria are not precisely defined. 
The same is true of the third criterion (degree of acceptance). Therefore, the 
procedure leaves considerable room for interpretation as to which bids are 
the best. Just as in the case of the UVIs and the UWV, the format of the 
competition is a simultaneous sealed bid type, where each bidder places 
only one bid. If the procedure were to allow sequential bidding, the 
competing firms would learn more about the municipality’s preferences and 
would be able to make more realistic bids. 
The reintegration firms are supposed to use three types of services: (i) 
placement in an regular job; (ii) placement in a subsidized job, and (iii) 
social activation. The contracts contain targets with respect to the placement 
rates. For category 3 clients, for example, 55 percent must be placed in a 
regular job and 35 per cent in a subsidized job. In 10 per cent of the cases 
placement activities are allowed to fail. Reasons for failure can be that the 
client has dropped out (maximum of 5 per cent) or that it simply proved 
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 (too) difficult to place him (maximum of 5 per cent). However, when more 
than 5 per cent of the clients drop out, it is still possible that the firm gets 
paid. This is the case when drop out is due to unwillingness of the client. In 
order to get paid the reintegration firm has to report the matter to the 
municipalities at an early stage and, after consultation with the 
municipality, put sufficient effort in the case. Therefore, in practice actual 
placement figures may be lower than the target values without any financial 
consequences for the reintegration firm.  
Clients, on the other hand, have the right to complain to the provider about 
poor service provision. The provider must develop a procedure indicating 
how it deals with complaints. It must also register the complaints. 
Furthermore, every quarter the provider must send this registration to the 
municipality. 
The activities of the reintegration firm starts with an assessment phase that 
takes no longer than 2 months. This diagnostic phase results in a 
reintegration plan for the clients. The municipality must approve the plan. 
In this phase it may already appear that some clients are unwilling or cannot 
be helped for some other reason. The placement targets mentioned before 
only refer to the approved reintegration plans. After approval the client 
must be placed within a period of six months. A placement only ‘counts’ 
when the client stays in employment for at least six months. When more 
clients are placed in regular jobs than the target rate, the firm gets € 900 for 
every additional placement. When the placements stay below the target a 
fine is imposed of € 900 multiplied by the difference between the target and 
the actual result. The price will be determined in the beauty contest and is 
not yet known. On the basis of what we know about previous beauty 
contests it will probably be something like four thousand euros per client. 
Therefore, the level of the bonus and the fine is relatively high. It is unclear 
how the fact that the municipality has already set specific placement targets 
as well as a system of bonuses and fines can be reconciled with the use of 
placement results as one of the criteria for choosing between different bids. 
The detailed description of client profiles, tasks and targets comes very 
close to an auction, while the article describing how the bids are to be 
judged clearly implies a beauty contest. The two seem to be mixed up. 
Service provision includes activities to remove factors hampering labour 
market participation (family situation, health situation, social skills, etc.) as 
well as placement activities. The municipality arranges child-care facilities, 
financial help for clients with debts and the availability of subsidized jobs. 
Training is excluded from the normal service provision. Only in special 
cases the municipality is prepared to provide additional funding for training. 
Clearly, it will be the exception rather than the rule. 
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 The client managers of the municipalities are supposed to keep track of the 
clients. Each quarter they receive a progress report from the reintegration 
firm. At least some of the information is put in a database containing 
individual data about the treatment offered, whether the client was placed, 
how much time it took, etc. 
The previous paragraphs may give a better understanding how 
municipalities currently deal with the obligation to organise procurement 
procedures. This example of a medium-sized municipality points to a 
certain progress in the way municipalities take care of this obligation. 
However, on a number of important points serious questions remain. First 
of all the procurement procedure is not theoretically efficient and does not 
give sufficient guarantees that the best bid wins and that the winning bid is 
realistic in terms of service level and price. Secondly, the definition of the 
client profiles is almost entirely based on the profiling made by the CWI. 
However, their profiling procedure is flawed, which is now generally 
recognized. Therefore, the placement targets set may not correspond to 
realistic a priori assumptions concerning the easiness or the difficulty to 
place the clients included in the various lots. Both in absolute and in 
relative terms the targets come out of the blue. It is also clear that the 
reintegration activities have a short-term orientation and are not taking 
possible discrepancies between labour demand and labour supply into 
consideration. Training will hardly be offered. 
Concluding comments 
Although our analysis is based on a small sample of municipalities the 
results point to considerable weaknesses of the procurement of employment 
services by municipalities. It casts doubt on the belief that such procedures 
would improve the quality and reduce the costs of employment services. A 
more general consideration is whether a good labour market policy is at all 
possible from a purely local perspective. So, even when the procedures 
were efficient, they would not guarantee a good labour market policy. 
Starting from 2004 municipalities will receive one budget out of which they 
have to pay social assistance benefits and another budget from which they 
can finance reintegration activities (including job creation schemes). If a 
municipality spends less on benefits than the budget accounts for, it can use 
the difference to its own choice (for additional expenses on reintegration, 
for example). The national schemes for subsidised labour will be 
abandoned. The government hopes that this new system will provide more 
incentives to municipalities to reduce the number of beneficiaries and to put 
more emphasis on placement in regular jobs than in subsidized jobs 
(although municipalities are free to develop their own schemes for 
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 subsidised labour). Some fear that in the present labour market situation 
with high unemployment and fewer vacancies, this will induce 
municipalities to spend less on reintegration activities (particularly on 
training).   
Some of the reintegration firms hired by the municipalities also work for 
the UWV. An interesting question is how they prioritise the different 
categories of clients in their work. At least to some extent the different 
categories compete for the same kind of jobs. Competition issues will also 
arise when a municipality (or the UWV for that matter) defines different 
lots containing groups of clients that look for the same types of jobs. The 
problem of ‘fishing in the same water’ is particularly pressing in the current 
situation. 
6 BEAUTY CONTEST, AUCTION AND QUALITY 
MEASUREMENT 
Would auctions have given better results? 
The purpose of outsourcing placement activities to private agencies is to 
improve the efficiency of the services, to raise their quality or to have both 
of these improvements. Although we lack information on the impact of the 
procurement procedure on the effectiveness and the efficiency of 
reintegration services, the previous sections make it at least improbable that 
such an improvement really occurred. We have pointed to a number of 
weaknesses both in the design of the procurement procedures and in the 
way these were implemented. However, could making use of an auction 
instead of a beauty contest have prevented these problems? 
The main difference between an auction and a beauty contest is that in the 
former case quality is taken as given and the bidding is solely on the price, 
while in the latter case both quality and price determine the choice made by 
the contracting agency. In case of an auction bidders should fulfil two 
requirements: 
− the guarantee that the quality of the services exceeds the minimum 
level as specified by the contracting party; 
− a certain experience of their staff to make their bid credible. 
The contract could then be given to the bidder with the lowest price. Such a 
procedure seems to be much simpler and transparent. One does not need a 
score function. 
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 However, at closer look things are not that easy. The problem lies in 
ensuring a minimum service quality level. As we will show now, it appears 
to be extremely difficult to measure quality in the field of reintegration 
services.  
What is quality in relation to reintegration services? 
The purpose of reintegration services is to increase the transition rate from 
inactivity to employment for the target groups of these services. In the 
Netherlands target groups for these services are the disabled, the long-term 
unemployed and short-term unemployed in high risk of long-term 
unemployed. What is aimed at is a positive net effect: the difference 
between the transition rate with and without the services. We know that 
without the application of the services still at least some people from the 
target groups would find a job19. Therefore, reintegration services must be 
judged on their net effectiveness. Placement figures as such are 
meaningless. 
We know quite a lot about the net effectiveness of reintegration services or 
measures. It has been investigated in many studies covering many 
countries. From a methodological point of view two types of studies can be 
distinguished. The first type tries to assess the impact of reintegration by 
estimating econometric models using aggregate data. A summary of the 
literature can be found in De Koning (2001). The second type uses a control 
group design based on micro data. For this part of the literature we refer to 
Heckman et al (1999). In both cases the overall conclusion is that the net 
impact of reintegration measures is small. In some cases participation in a 
measure appears to prolong unemployment duration rather than shortening 
it. The net effects on job entry chances tend to be higher for disadvantaged 
groups such as the long-term unemployed, but even here the average 
impacts found are of limited size and the variation in the effects 
considerable. Some reintegration instruments may give better results than 
others. According to the literature inventory made by Martin and Grubb 
(2002) job mediation is more effective than training and wage-subsidies, at 
                                                     
19  Particularly in the United States experiments have been held in which a measure is 
applied to a randomly selected group of unemployed participants, which is then 
compared to a (also randomly selected) control group of unemployed non-participants. 
Invariably we can observe that also from the latter group a considerable percentage 
finds a job. For further reading we refer to Heckman et al (1999). 
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 least in terms of short-term job placement results20. In defence of training 
one could argue that most evaluations of this instrument (as of other 
instruments for that matter) only measure short-term outcomes, while a 
substantial increase in competences as a result of training might not so 
much reduce the length of the current unemployment spell, but rather 
reduce the probability of future unemployment. 
The design of the 2001 procurement procedure discussed in the previous 
sections does not give any guarantee for positive net effects. Also in view 
of the placement outcomes we consider it to be unlikely that the effects are 
better than before 2001; they may even have been worse. The tendency in 
the 2002 and 2003 procedures to make payment to the reintegration firms 
increasingly dependent on placement may lead to better outcomes, but 
information about it is lacking. The impact of performance-based payment 
may be reduced by the fact that reintegration firms can to some extent 
refuse clients. The performance-related payment only applies to the clients 
that actually enter a reintegration pathway. 
How could we get a reasonable chance of positive net effects? 21 
How should the procedure be altered in order to get a reasonable chance of 
positive net effects? What we need is a good estimate of the job chances 
that the clients would have had without treatment. Based on data from the 
recent past such estimates could be made. Separate estimates could be made 
for different groups of clients, taking account of the fact that job chances 
depend strongly on characteristics such as age, gender, education, ethnic 
origin and handicap. From this information, sensible minimum 
requirements could be derived for different groups of clients. For each 
group treatment should result in job chances that are as least as good as in 
the case without treatment. Such a procedure would acknowledge that for 
particularly disadvantaged groups placement figures less than, say, 35 per 
cent might already be satisfactory; while in other (presumably most) cases 
much higher placement figures must be expected. So far, client 
heterogeneity owing to the previously mentioned characteristics has only 
                                                     
20 For the Netherlands few results are available concerning the net impact of job 
mediation. The study by Heydra et al (2003) is one of the few exceptions. It confirms 
the conclusions from the international literature that at least in terms of short-term 
effects mediation is more effective than training. However, as in most other Dutch 
evaluation studies no correction for selection bias was made in this study and there 
were shortcomings in the data. As we indicated earlier, the primary purpose of the 
study by Heyma was not to measure net impacts. 
21  Partly based on De Koning and Van Acht (2000). 
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 partly been taken into account in the procurement procedure. And as far as 
it played a role, it was not based on statistical information. However, the 
information for estimating ex-ante job entry chances is available and 
examples are available how it could be done. 
Although the individual characteristics mentioned account for some of the 
variation between individual unemployment spells, a considerable part 
remains unexplained by them. Probably, psychological factors and other 
factors that are difficult to measure are also important determinants of 
unemployment duration. To some extent the latter factors are taken into 
account in the profiling procedure as conducted by the employment offices. 
On the basis of this procedure, which is mainly qualitative by nature, a 
decision is taken which new unemployed clients are sent to the UWV and 
the municipalities. However, nothing is known about the validity of the risk 
assessment made by the employment offices. It would be better if the risk 
assessment was made on the basis of a statistically validated model 
including a whole range of factors varying from such factors as age and 
education to psychological factors. 
Estimates of job chances can only be made based on data from the (recent) 
past. However, after the contracts with the reintegration firms are made, the 
labour market situation may change. It is possible to include contingency 
arrangements in the contract to deal with this problem. On the basis of past 
data the job chances can also be related to the general labour market 
situation. Then, the contracts made with the reintegration firms may include 
rules how the minimum requirements regarding job chances are adjusted 
with the state of the labour market.  
If we would alter the system in that way, we would still leave it to the UWV 
and the municipalities to decide which services to apply to a specific group 
of clients. Quality would even be more ensured if we would know in 
advance which services are most effective for a given group of clients. 
Then, the UWV and the municipalities could prescribe to the reintegration 
firms, which services to use. In that case an auction would become possible 
in which the reintegration firms would only bid on the basis of the price. 
The question is: how can the UWV and the municipalities find out what is 
best? In principle, an experiment could provide the information needed. In 
the United States several examples of such experiments can be found in the 
field of reintegration measures. In such an experiment both a group of 
participants and a control group are randomly selected from the target 
group. Specific services (training, for example) are provided to the 
participants and not to the control group. Then, both groups are monitored 
for a sufficiently long period to see whether the participants have higher job 
entry rates than the controls. If needed several types of services could be 
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 tested for several groups. On the basis of the outcomes a decision could be 
taken which types of services are most appropriate for the various groups. 
Furthermore, the experiment would also indicate the expected placement 
rates which could serve as minimum requirement in the bidding process. A 
disadvantage of UWV and the municipalities prescribing the types of 
services may be that there are few possibilities for reintegration firms to 
develop new products. 
So far, experiments in the field of labour market policy involving random 
assignment have not been applied in the Netherlands. The most important 
reason seems to be that it is legally impossible to exclude individuals from 
‘treatment’. Then, we would have to choose the control group from the ones 
that did not wish to be “treated” or are not selected for treatment by the 
authorities. However, this is most likely a selective group making the 
comparison with the participants difficult if not impossible. Although 
methods have been developed to deal with this type of selectivity, these are 
far from reliable. A second reason not to conduct an experiment is that it 
takes too much time. Although both arguments against conducting 
experiments are not convincing to us, they do seem to be to the authorities. 
Then the non-experimental approach mentioned earlier could be a 
reasonable alternative. 
Assessing quality ex-post 
For several reasons it is important to make an ex-post evaluation of the 
service delivery. First, even if – owing to an experiment – an ex-ante 
estimate of the net effectiveness was available, the ex-post results could 
differ from it. Second, at least ex-post placement figures are needed to 
determine whether reintegration firms have fulfilled the placement criterion. 
Such information is also important for future tendering procedures, in 
which credibility will most likely be one of the criteria. And last but not 
least, an ex-post evaluation may throw light on different implementation 
strategies as used by the various reintegration firms. Information about 
which strategies lead to the best results may contribute to the overall 
effectiveness of the reintegration services. For each contract between an 
UWV/municipality and a reintegration firm, information on costs, service 
content, number and characteristics of clients and placement results are 
available. A comparative analysis based on this data seems to be highly 
relevant. We don’t know, however, whether the available data is sufficient 
for a solid analysis. 
The available information makes it possible to compare the results if the 
various service providers. It is also important to compare the job entry rates 
of the clients of the reintegration firms with those of unemployed and 
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 disabled persons that were not treated. Such a comparison would give us an 
ex-post estimate of the net placement effects. We don’t know, however, 
whether it is possible to form such a comparison group and whether 
sufficient data is available. Clearly, the authorities did not envisage such an 
analysis. 
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given the delegation of reintegration services to the benefit agencies and 
the requirement to outsource implementation to the private sector a number 
of improvements are possible. These we discuss first. However, in our view 
the current system suffers from a number of basic deficiencies requiring 
system reforms. These will be discussed next. 
Recommendations within the boundaries of the current system 
In our view a restricted procurement procedure must be preferred. Such a 
procedure consists of two stages: the qualifying stage and the bidding stage. 
It is important that the awarding authority, the UWV or a municipality, 
defines quality as good as possible. In order to do that it should make an ex-
ante assessment of the job chances of the various client groups. On the basis 
of such an assessment requirements regarding placement results could be 
set that give a reasonable guarantee for positive net effects of the 
reintegration services. Bidders should, of course, be informed about the 
outcome of this assessment. Although one could envisage that the bidding 
focuses then completely on the price (in which case we would have an 
auction), we tend to prefer a beauty contest in which quality and price both 
determine the outcome. The reason for that is that by taking quality into 
consideration reintegration firms are stimulated to innovate their service 
provision. In view of the generally disappointing results of activation and 
reintegration services, there is a need for such innovations. Furthermore, 
quality as such may be important and, for instance, underinvestment in 
training must be avoided. The question of credibility should be dealt with 
completely in the qualifying stage and should then be left to rest. The 
criteria used in the qualifying stage should be such that newcomers are not 
excluded almost by definition. The procedure should result in a sufficient 
number of competitors (five to seven) for each lot. To be efficient lots have 
to be homogeneous. Furthermore, weights have to be made explicit.  
However, independent of the question whether there is an auction or a 
beauty contest it is essential that the organization buying the services knows 
which percentage of clients would find a job without the services. In 
principle, this is one of the things profiling should do. However, the 
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 profiling system currently used by the CWIs is purely qualitative and as far 
as we know it is far from reliable. UWV does not have a system of its own 
and we did not come across any municipality with such a system. However, 
the necessary data and methods are available. 
It is important that on beforehand the awarding authority makes 
arrangements for the collection of the necessary data for an ex-post 
evaluation. Furthermore, benchmarking of reintegration firms and of 
municipalities is highly informative. These evaluation activities should 
provide information on the net placement results, the performance of the 
various service providers and the variation in quality and implementation 
strategies (as determining factors of the placement results). However, what 
strikes the eye most in the new system is the lack of information about its 
performance. The agencies in charge of reintegration are not very keen to 
provide information about the results of the reintegration activities they 
outsource to private providers. Very few attempts have been made to 
measure the impacts of the activities. And as far as information about the 
activities is available it is often considered as confidential. Ultimately the 
ministry is responsible as provider of the funding for the reintegration. 
However, neither the ministry seems to be convinced of the need for 
information. Actually, the official point of view is that given the fact that 
the system has been decentralized and privatized, also the responsibility lies 
with the actors in the field. It is now up to the market, so they say. This is a 
very naive view on the private procurement of employment services. If 
those in charge of the procurement process don’t have any idea about the 
effects of the interventions on job entry rates, it is difficult to see how they 
can guide it in such a way that there is a reasonable chance of success. 
Private providers do not have an interest in providing high quality services 
for low costs if they are not judged. 
Clearly, a satisfactory design and implementation of a procurement 
procedure in the field of reintegration services is highly demanding for the 
awarding authority. It seems to make sense to make use of external 
expertise on procurement and evaluation. Furthermore, one could think of 
the government providing advise and even imposing requirements 
regarding the procurement procedure. This seems to be particularly relevant 
for the smaller municipalities. 
Some of the problems identified in this paper can be seen as child diseases 
of the new system. Comparing the 2000, 2001 and 2002 procurement 
procedures by UWV one can observe a certain improvement, although the 
potential improvements in the 2002 procedure have probably only partly 
been realised. An interesting development is the increasing opportunities 
offered to clients to choose between different providers and to influence the 
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 content of their reintegration pathway. In this way the system may develop 
features similar to the Australian system (see Struyven, Steurs and Peter, 
2002). Also on this point, however, it is important to see what will happen 
in practice.  
System weaknesses 
However, the question remains whether the awarding authority itself has a 
sufficient incentive to get a maximum result out of the procurement 
procedure. This is at least unclear. The incentive structure would be clearer 
if both the delivery of benefits and reintegration services would be 
outsourced to private companies. The role of the government could then be 
restricted to developing a set of rules such as the entitlement criteria for a 
benefit. In the United States examples of such a system can be found. 
However, the question is whether in such a system reasonable guarantees 
can be given that sufficient effort is made to help the most disadvantaged 
groups. In theory such a system may work, but in practice this will highly 
depend on how the government manages the process. On the basis of past 
experiences high hopes are not justified here.  
Another basic point of criticism is that benefit agencies approach 
reintegration from a rather narrow perspective. If they have at all a clear 
incentive, it is to reduce the number of beneficiaries. However, in the 
current situation with high numbers of unemployed people and low 
numbers of unfilled vacancies it does not seem realistic to assume that 
reintegration will lead to such a reduction in the short-run. Perhaps 
municipalities may value the significance of subsidized labour to the 
community. But an one-sided orientation on subsidized labour may be 
dangerous as it may keep people out of the regular labour market 
permanently. A narrow perspective on active policies does not take account 
of the potential long-term macro-economic effects it can have by improving 
the employability of unemployed and other inactive people. Such a narrow 
perspective may lead to a general underinvestment in active policies and in 
particular of the training instrument. 
Another negative feature of the new system is that it offers hardly any 
services to employers. If an industry cannot attract a sufficient number of 
qualified workers or if many of its workers are redundant and have to be 
replaced to other sectors, they cannot make a deal with one or a few 
organizations. The CWI can only offer few services. The responsibility for 
reintegration services is distributed over hundreds of municipalities. Only 
the UWV is a large partner organized on the national level. 
S252papfin 43
 Therefore it’s crucial that the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 
changes its current laissez-faire attitude and takes up its coordinating role.22 
Furthermore, the CWIs should get more opportunities for services to both 
jobseekers and employers. The job brokerage activities must be enhanced. 
It is not necessary to increase the own capacity of the CWIs. It is also 
possible that they involve private agencies. Given the fact that the CWIs 
have the disposal of information on individual jobseekers and vacancies, 
and are engaged in job brokerage themselves, they are more qualified and 
equipped to outsource job mediation and training to private providers than 
the benefit agencies. In our view a considerable part of the funding for 
active policies (but not all of it) should be shifted to the CWIs with the 
obligation to involve private providers using procurement procedures. The 
benefit agencies should then only deal with specific reintegration measures 
for specific groups (for example subsidized labour for highly disadvantaged 
groups and job mediation activities to stimulate the transition from 
subsidized to regular jobs for these groups). 
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